Extensive systems have been deployed to use Global Positioning System (“GPS”) capabilities for the purpose of tracking vehicle fleets including truck trailers, truck tractors, and/or trucks, railcars, or fleets of cargo containers. Such systems have been referred to as “asset tracking systems” and deploy asset-tracking units designed to be attached to individual vehicles. Each asset-tracking unit typically includes a GPS receiver that is capable of receiving GPS signals from a plurality of GPS satellites, thereby determining the unit's location based on the GPS signals. Upon obtaining a position fix, the asset tracking unit may report the unit's location via satellite communication (using another set of satellites) to a central station. With such a system, the proprietor of the vehicle fleet may have close to real-time information concerning the whereabouts of all vehicles in the fleet. This may lead to significant efficiencies in planning and managing assignments of vehicles to particular tasks.
In addition, an asset tracking system of this type may help in the detection of, and response to, irregularities such as theft of vehicles or their contents. It has been proposed to install one or more sensors in or on a vehicle with the sensor(s) interfaced to the asset-tracking unit assigned to the vehicle. The sensor(s) may detect changes in conditions related to the vehicle, such as opening or closing of a door of a vehicle, loading or unloading of cargo in or from the vehicle and (where the vehicle is a truck trailer) coupling or de-coupling of the vehicle to or from a truck tractor. The sensor(s) may provide signals indicative of such events to the asset-tracking unit, which may then report the events to the central station to increase the amount of information about the operation of the vehicle that is present in the asset tracking system. In at least some cases, the system may notify a user/attendant of the events, and the user/attendant may take steps to respond to the events.
Potential disadvantages of reporting and responding to events in an asset tracking system may involve an expenditure of resources such as battery power capacity of the asset tracking units, use of satellite communication systems and charges for such use, and attendant time and attention for receiving reports of events and/or responding to such reports.
Cargo theft in the United States has reached gigantic proportions. A disturbing number of those thefts (40% by some estimates) involve driver and warehouse personnel complicity. Trailer theft by deception is not uncommon. Fraudulent authorization papers presented to security by a driver will allow that driver to depart the facility with a stolen trailer.
Many facilities are closed when trucks arrive, and drivers are dependent on prior dispatch information to accurately drop and hook trailers. Information received by a driver from dispatch prior to arrival at a facility is rendered inaccurate if changes have been made at the designated facility and the driver is unaware of these changes. At large busy facilities traffic control generally does not always have an accurate account of the disposition of trailers, dock doors or parking space that is already occupied. It is common practice at facilities for security to instruct an incoming truck to park the trailer in a designated parking area without assigning a parking space number to the driver. Security and traffic control are dependent on the driver to inform them of parking space location of parked trailers and the parking space location from which a trailer is retrieved for departure from the facility.
It is not uncommon at large facilities for traffic control to dispatch a yard tug driver to go and “find” a particular trailer and report its location back to traffic control. Crowded, disorganized parking of trailers at parking areas within the facility is commonplace. Equipment and property are damaged by drivers in the process of parking and retrieving trailers at these areas.
Security at some facilities is non-existent. At other facilities, security consists of a security guard making rounds of the property at regular intervals. However, a security guard cannot be in all places at all times. Other measures of security presently employed include cameras and seals or locks on trailer doors, but cameras are easily rendered inoperable, and seals and locks can be cut with bolt cutters or a hacksaw.
Satellite communication is employed in specific areas of truck operations and is primarily a tracking system that ‘observes’ from space. However, satellite tracking, while useful in some areas of the industry, is susceptible to atmospheric and technical interference. It also does not address the continuous multiple tracking, loading/unloading, parking, damage control and security problems presently existing at large busy facilities. In addition, the effectiveness of the satellite tracking system is dependent on an attachment to the trailer to accommodate satellite tracking signal, and any attachment to a trailer is vulnerable to vandalism, theft or deactivation.
While some large facilities do have computerized tracking systems in place, they are simply that—tracking systems for containers within that particular facility. None are integrated into a security line, which alerts security and other authorities when a breach of security takes place.
More recently, the US Food & Drug Administration has enacted the Food Safety Modernization Act. The FDA Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA) rule on Sanitary Transportation of Human and Animal Food is now final, advancing FDA's efforts to protect foods from farm to table by keeping them safe from contamination during transportation. FSMA has seven foundational rules proposed since January 2013 to create a modern, risk-based framework for food safety. The goal of this rule is to prevent practices during transportation that create food safety risks, such as failure to properly refrigerate food, inadequate cleaning of vehicles between loads, and failure to properly protect food, from farm to fork, so to speak.
The rule builds on the safeguards envisioned in the 2005 Sanitary Food Transportation Act (SFTA). Because of illness outbreaks resulting from human and animal food contaminated during transportation, and incidents and reports of unsanitary transportation practices, there have long been concerns about the need for regulations to ensure that foods are being transported in a safe manner.
The rule establishes requirements for shippers, loaders, carriers by motor or rail vehicle, and receivers involved in transporting human and animal food to use sanitary practices to ensure the safety of that food. The requirements do not apply to transportation by ship or air because of limitations in the law.
Specifically, the FSMA rule establishes requirements for vehicles and transportation equipment, transportation operations, records, training and waivers. With some exceptions, the final rule applies to shippers, receivers, loaders and carriers who transport food in the United States by motor or rail vehicle, whether or not the food is offered for or enters interstate commerce. It also applies to persons, e.g., shippers, in other countries who ship food to the United States directly by motor or rail vehicle (from Canada or Mexico), or by ship or air, and arrange for the transfer of the intact container onto a motor or rail vehicle for transportation within the U.S., if that food will be consumed or distributed in the United States. The rule does not apply to exporters who ship food through the United States (for example, from Canada to Mexico) by motor or rail vehicle if the food does not enter U.S. distribution. Companies involved in the transportation of food intended for export are covered by the rule until the shipment reaches a port or U.S. border.
Specifically, the rule would establish requirements for: (1) vehicles and transportation equipment: The design and maintenance of vehicles and transportation equipment to ensure that it does not cause the food that it transports to become unsafe. For example, they must be suitable and adequately cleanable for their intended use and capable of maintaining temperatures necessary for the safe transport of food; (2) transportation operations: The measures taken during transportation to ensure food safety, such as adequate temperature controls, preventing contamination of ready to eat food from touching raw food, protection of food from contamination by non-food items in the same load or previous load, and protection of food from cross-contact, i.e., the unintentional incorporation of a food allergen; (3) Training: Training of carrier personnel in sanitary transportation practices and documentation of the training. This training is required when the carrier and shipper agree that the carrier is responsible for sanitary conditions during transport; and (4) records: Maintenance of records of written procedures, agreements, and training (required of carriers). The required retention time for these records depends on the type of record and when the covered activity occurred but does not exceed 12 months.
The result of FSMA is that the largest food distribution systems will be compelled to add a monitoring and safety cost to their transportation and logistics operations. However, the smaller entities will be presented with these increases as well. While FSMA purports to lessen the burden on the smaller operators, it does not go far enough. In reality, the small food operators (e.g., the “family farmer”) will find it next to impossible to comply with FSMA in a meaningful way, being compliant, yet in a cost-effective manner.
As a result, there are several significant issues with the prior art. First, many systems rely on sensors that are permanently mounted to cargo containers or truck trailers. Fixed devices can become obsolete, and small time operators may find their subscription cost and updating to be cost prohibitive. Next, fixed sensors need to communicate with the outside world, so many are equipped with satellite transponders or cell phone or wireless interfaces. Again, this approach is very costly. Next, software that links trucks with truck operators and ties in purchase orders or manifest reports is often “enterprise” in nature, and therefore often cost prohibitive for small operators or inefficient even for larger operators. In addition, when the payload is of relatively low value, such as a regular crop yield, high cost fixed sensors, satellite communications enterprise software adds too much cost; yet, the problem is that even a routine crop like lettuce, while not itself valuable, needs to be safeguarded against food contamination, bioterrorism and other threats to the food supply.
In other words, the crop value isn't as critical as the potential damage a contaminated crop may cause in the food chain. Very few of the prior art systems use the smartphone of a truck driver, and those that do lack the sophistication to ensure food safety or cargo security from point to point with the ability to ensure that even between various drivers and intermodal transit, a cargo load, once locked, is secure against damage and tampering.
The prior art completely neglects to link the now commonplace personal driver smartphone with the outside world, including cargo sensors, locks, electronic Bluetooth locks, cargo monitoring software, scheduling software, purchase order and inventory management software, farming or agricultural production software and point of delivery warehouse tracking software or even end point grocery store inventory management software. The prior art does not teach compliance with the Food Safety and Modernization Act through the use of a personally owned driver smartphone as the communications hub and lock verification mechanism.
Yard management, fleet management, mobile dispatch and delivery, cross-docking, terminal and distribution center operations, shipping and railway operations, GPS, telemetry, remote management and RFID solutions quickly add cost to operations. Most institutional transport companies are reluctant to rely on personal smartphones for fear of a security breach. However, with respect to FSMA compliance, which has been extended to even the smallest of operators, relying on the generally present driver smartphone saves significant expenses. If a driver does not have a capable smartphone (with a camera , Bluetooth interface, and a carrier connection), a transportation network may decide to drop that driver or provide a driver with a rented smartphone for transport usage, much the same way some cab companies operate for transporting people.
Finally, mechanical seals (plastic or metallic) do not provide real time monitored solutions to the problem at hand. Most tractor trailers are equipped with locking hardware, usually requiring the use of a padlock. Typically, the padlock is manual and requires the use of a physical key. However, many leading lock manufacturers such as Master Lock and Medeco (Assa Abloy) now manufacture sophisticated electronic wireless locks, controllable via smartphone. One missing link between these systems is the necessity of the electronic lock being able to communicate with existing payload safety and security systems, and transmit data to trailer load owners or supervisors on an efficient basis without the need for expensive enterprise software.
In particular, U.S. Pat. No. 8,453,481 to Master Lock discloses an electromechanical lock controlled by electronic means, and U.S. Pat. No. 9,109,379 discloses a padlock controlled by a smartphone. In all cases, the mechanical interface to electronic control mechanisms are disclosed, but not tied to the requirements of the Food Safety Modernization Act, or FSMA.
Under FSMA, once a payload of food is loaded into a trailer, it must be secured and access limited until it reaches its intended endpoint. Consequently, prior art systems lack a supervisory level of lock monitoring and control, whereby the monitoring and control are carried out the most efficient way possible. What is missing is a system whereby the communications hub is the typical truck driver smartphone, with its ability to access the internet, the cloud, GPS coordinates and cell phone towers.
In addition, what is missing is that the truck driver's smartphone accesses precise time of day and day of year data, and is usually Bluetooth compatible, so it could monitor and control appliances associated with FSMA compliance. Yet, no system has utilized these building blocks in this manner. Moreover, portable electronic wireless locks lack the ability to be programmed and then encrypted for a set number of “lock” and “unlock” operations, based on frequency, time of day, GPS position, or other authorization codes associated with the payload itself or its supervisor.
Electronic lock manufacturers have not provided for a simple FSMA compliant electronic lock, where the firmware and software are embedded within the lock itself (rechargeable or by battery operation) so that a lock may be “set” to permit just one “lock” and then one “unlock”. The payload supervisor or owner would have to override the setting so that a truck driver can comply with FSMA, whereby loads must be essentially locked and secured from “farm to fork”, or at least from “farm” to warehouse or warehouse to warehouse or warehouse to retail outlet, etc.